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STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN R. MITCHELL, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MERLIN C. PALMER, FLOYD PALM-
ER, JOHN FRANK PALMER, DAVE 
CLAIR PALMER AND LOLA ALICE 
SCHIESS, and FLOYD PALMER AS 
TRUSTEE FOR ABOVE NAMED DE-
FENDANTS, 
Respondents, 
Case No. 7706 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 
Appellant is the surviving husband of Eliza J. Mitchell, 
who died on December 23rd, 1948 ( R. 1). Eliza J. Mitchell 
was formerly Eliza J. Palmer, she is the mother of respond-
ents. 
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Eliza J. Mitchell and appellant were, at the time of 
death of Mrs. Mitchell, the owners of two properties situated 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, one of which properties is situated 
on Wilmington Avenue, which was the family home of Mrs. 
Mitchell and appellant (R. 23) at the time of death of Mrs. 
Mitchell, the other property is situated on Garfield Avenue. 
Record title to both properties was in Eliza J. Mitchell and 
appel1ant as joint tenants and not as tenants in common and 
to the survivor of them at the time of the death of Mrs. 
Mitchell (R 24 and 25). 
Prior to the death of Mrs. Mitchell, the Garfield Ave-
nue property was sold on contract to E. E. Smith, who paid 
the sum of $60 a month on the contract, these payments 
were made to the First Security Bank, Exchange Place 
branch, Salt Lake City, Utah and deposited to the joint bank 
account of Mrs. Mitchell and appellant ( R 26) . These con-
tract payments were received by Mrs. Mitchell and appellant 
each month from the date of sale of the property to the time of 
the death of Mrs. Mitchell, and one payment, that made Jan-
uary, 1949, which was subsequent to the death of Mrs. Mitch-
ell (Dec. 23, 1948), was received by appellant. All other 
payments made on the contract subsequent to the death of 
Mrs. Mitchell were made to respondents, this without the 
consent of appellant (R 27). There was an unpaid balance 
on the Smith contract of approximately $5000.00 at the time 
of death of J\1rs. Mitchell (R 28). 
The properties herein mentioned were at the time of 
their acquisition, paid for by check out of the joint account 
of Mrs. Mitchell and appellant. (R 139-Ex. F). This account 
had been transferred by Mrs. Mitchell and appellant from 
a joint account maintained by Mrs. Mitchell and appellant 
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in the First Security Bank of Idaho, to which account both 
Mrs. Mitchell and appellant had contributed. That money 
contributed to the joint account by Mrs. Mitchell came from 
the sale of real property inherited by Mrs. Mitchell from her 
former husband, Mr. Palmer, the father of respondents, title 
to which had subsequent to the death of Mr. Palmer been 
placed in the name of Floyd Palmer as trustee. That money 
contributed to the joint account by appellant was from the 
sale of bonds and earnings of appellant. 
Upon the sale of the Idaho property, respondents joined 
m deeds divesting themselves of the Idaho property, part 
of the proceeds from which went into the joint account of 
Mrs. Mitchell and appellant. That account was, for in excess 
of two years, treated at all times as the property of Mrs. 
:Mitchell and appellant and was used and drawn on as they 
saw fit. No demand was ever made on the account by re-
spondents nor was any action to impress the account with a 
trust ever taken by respondents. 
A portion of the money received from the sale of the 
Idaho property was invested in postal savings bonds. 
Appellant testified to the fact that prior to the death of 
Mrs. Mitchell, respondents Floyd and Merlin Palmer advised 
their mother, Mrs. Mitchell, and appellant that provided they 
would cash the postal savings bonds and invest the proceeds 
in Hart Music Company they would receive ten or twelve per 
cent interest on their money (R 23) and would save 40% 
discount which they might lose by retaining the bonds ( R 
43, 54), at the same time advising appellant that it would 
be necessary for him to sign papers to appoint Floyd Palmer, 
one of the respondents, as trustee. ( R 34). 
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Thereafter, on or about June 1st, 1948 papers were 
handed to Mrs. Mitchell while in a grave ill condition (R 
168) for her signature and to appellant for his signature, 
at which time as appellant testified, it was represented to 
appellant and to Mrs. Mitchell that the papers were those pre-
viously discussed to effect a saving of discount on the postal 
savings bonds and to make it possible to invest in Hart Music 
Company, and as appellant testified, in reliance upon such 
statement he and Mrs. Mitchell signed the papers (R22). 
Appellant testified that it was many months after the 
death of Mrs. :Mitchell before appellant discovered that he 
had executed documents divesting appellant of title to the 
two properties ( R 43). It was admitted that Mrs. Mitchell 
did not execute any documents in the presence of Mr. Hart, 
a brother-in-law of respondent Merlin Palmer, who appears 
as Notary Public on the deeds by which title to the property 
was conveyed (R 164). Witness Hart, the Notary Public, 
admitted that the documents were not at the time they were 
purportedly executed by Mrs. Mitchell acknowledged to have 
been signed by Mrs. Mitchell, that it was not until Septem· 
her or October, 1948 when they were acknowledged (R 145) 
which was many months after respondent Merlin Palmer had 
taken the documents and deposited them in the safety deposit 
box. A conflict appears in the evidence as to whether appel-
lant executed documents in the presence of Mr. Hart, whose 
jurat appears on the deeds in question. 
Both respondents Merlin Palmer and Floyd Palmer 
testified to the fact that they were instructed when the docu· 
ments were handed to Merlin Palmer, to not record the same 
(R-193, 209) inasmuch as Mrs. Mitchell and appellant were 
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contemplating the sale or exchange of the properties for a 
duplex (R 194). 
It is admitted that at the time appellant executed the 
documents and they were taken possession of by respondent, 
Merlin Palmer, that no consideration passed to appellant (R 
191). Appellant had no property other than the two prop· 
erties herein described ( R 196). 
The documents when taken by respondent, Merlin Palm-
er, were taken to a safety deposit box at a bank which box 
stood in the joint names of Mrs. Mitchell, in appellant and in 
respondent Merlin Palmer. (R 193). The deeds were notre-
moved from the deposit box until after the death of Mrs. 
Mitchell when they were removed from the deposit box by 
respondent Merlin Palmer without the knowledge or consent 
of appellant (R 205). The deeds were recorded in the office 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, by re-
spondent Merlin Palmer six days after the deeath of Mrs. 
Mitchell, also without the knowledge or consent of appellant 
(R 193 Ex D and E). 
Some time after the deeds were signed, Mr. Osmond, 
a real estate agent, was employed to endeavor to sell the 
Wilmington Avenue property and to procure a duplex for 
appellant and Mrs. Mitchell so that they would realize the 
income therefrom because of appellant's advance age (R 
230), appellant was unable to work, appellant being 71 
years of age at the time ( R 25) . 
Respondents never at any time made demand on appel-
lant for the installment payments being received from the 
sale of the Garfield Avenue property or any part thereof 
during the lifetime of Mrs. Mitchell. 
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The trial court found that appellant when he signed 
the two deeds involved in the action, signed the deeds know-
ingly and willingly, and there were no misrepresentations 
as to the nature or content of the instrument made by the 
respondents, and the deeds, when signed, were complete 
except for the signatures of the grantors and the jurat of the 
notary, that appellant knew and intended, when said instru-
ments were executed, to convey to the grantee named therein 
any and all interest he had in the property described in the 
deeds, reserving only to himself a life estate in what is re-
ferred to as the Wilmington property; that said deeds are 
valid and subsisting deeds, and the appellant has a life estate 
in the Wilmington property and a life estate in all of the 
personal property described in Exhibit I. 
The court further found that the manner of execution 
and acknowledgment of the deeds is of no consequence and 
that the question of a trust being impressed upon the property 
is moot. 
The court held that the question of intent to execute the 
deeds on the part of appellant was not material. The court 
did not take into consideration the fact that no consideration 
was paid to appellant for the execution of the deeds. 
The court made no finding on the question of delivery 
of the deeds nor the right of appellant to a life estate in not 
only the Wilmington Avenue property but also in the Gar-
field Avenue property contract by which this property was 
sold to Smiths. The court ruled that there was no question 
of delivery involved in the case ( R.l97). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
l. The court erred in finding that appellant intended 
by the deeds to convey to the grantees his interest in the prop-
erties. 
2. The court erred in holding that there was no question 
involved in the case of delivery. 
3. The deeds were not entitled to be recorded and do 
not act to convey title to the real property. 
4. The court erred in not considering the question of 
intent and delivery of the deeds. 
ARGUMENT 
Point l. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPEL-
LANT INTENDED BY THE DEEDS TO CONVEY TO 
THE GRANTEES HIS INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES. 
The court found that appellant intended by the two 
deeds involved to convey to the grantees his interest in the 
property reserving only to himself a life estate in what is 
referred to as the Wilmington property and personal prop-
erty, but the court did not find and the evidence could not 
support a finding of the fact that appellant intended by the 
deeds to pass title to any of the properties immediately 
upon the death of Eliza J. Mitchell. Such a finding was 
necessary to effect the passing of title by the deeds during 
the lifetime of appellant. Even if it were conceded for the 
purpose of argument that the evidence did support the court's 
findings as entered, it must appear that the delivery was 
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intended to be irrevocable. See 28 C.J .639 (now 38 C.J .S., 
Gifts, Sec.25) as cited by this court in Losee v Jones, 235 
P2nd 132, at page 136, in which the court speaking through 
Mr. Justice Crockett said: 
"In the case of Singleton v Kelly, 61 Utah, 277, 212 
P.63, this court approved the applicable principles 
which have almost universal acceptance; That where 
a grantor executes a deed and places it in the hands of 
a third party for delivery after the death of the grant-
or, with the intent that the deed and its delivery are 
absolute, that the title in fact passes and the third 
party then holds the deed as trustee for the grantee. 
The court also recognized that if the delivery is con-
ditional, as where the grantor intends to retain control 
over the property and the right to revoke the deed, 
then such a deed does not pass title. In Reed v Knud-
son, 80 Utah 428, 15 P2d 347, an assignment of one-
half interest in certain property was upheld where the 
assignment was left for delivery by the attorney who 
prepared it for the donor. Therein we approved the 
rule quoted from 28 C.J. 639 (now 38 C.J.S., Gifts 
Sec.25), to the effect that if the deed and its delivery 
was intended to be irrevocable, then the third party 
is trustee for delivery of the deed and title passes. But 
if the intent is that the third party is subject to fur-
ther directions and control of the grantor, then the third 
party is merely the agent of the grantor and the title 
does not pass. See also Burnham v Eschler, Utah 1950, 
208 Pd 96; and Gappmayer v Wilenson, 53 Utah 
236, 177 P.763." (Italics added) 
In the instant case it is clearly apparent from the 
testimony of respondents Floyd and Merlin Palmer that 
control of the properties remained in Mrs. Mitchell and 
appellant, it having been admitted that they were instructed 
to not record the deeds inasmuch as Mrs. Mitchell and 
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appellant were considering exchanging the propertit's for 
income property. 
There is not one bit of evidence to the effect that the 
deeds were to be recorded upon the death of the one grantor, 
~Irs. Mitchell even though appellant who was the other 
grantor survived her. Neither is there any evidence to the 
effect that the life estate was to be created only in the Wilm-
ington property and the personal property and not in the 
Garfield A venue property. The record is lacking altogether 
of such evidence. In the testimony of witness Merlin Palmer 
we find the following: 
"Well he (Joel Hart) pointed out, or he said that the 
life estate was here, and indicated where it was written 
in." (R.191) "I told him that the property would, when 
it went back to the way it had been in Idaho, in Pres-
ton, Idaho, that it would be, that he would have a life 
estate .in the property, and could live in the house as 
long as he was living." ( R 192). 
There is not testimony to the effect that it was explained 
to appellant that the life estate would apply to the one prop-
ertly only and not to both. 
Witness for respondents, Merlin Palmer testified to 
the fact that he took the deeds to the deposit box which was 
in the bank to which appellant, Mrs. Mitchell and Merlin 
Palmer each had access, and left them there until after the 
death of Mrs. Mitchell when he removed them from the 
deposit box without the knowledge and consent of appel-
1ant, he caused them to be placed of record in the office of 
the recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. This witness also 
testified to the fact that he paid no consideration to appel-
lant at the time he obtained the deeds (R 191). 
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Point 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE 
WAS NO QUESTION INVOLVED IN THE CASE OF DE-
LIVERY (R 193). 
As heretofore stated, there is no evidence supporting 
the judgment that the deeds if valid, were to take effect 
during the lifetime of appellant. 
It is also clearly evident that monies which belonged 
not only to Mrs. Mitchell but also monies belonging to ap· 
pellant were deposited in the joint account from which the 
properties in question were purchased. 
It is also evident that respondents considered that ap· 
pellant and Mrs. Mitchell retained a life estate in the Gar-
field Avenue property sold to Smith's on contract, the pay-
ments on which were received by appellant and Mrs. Mitch-
ell each month during the lifetime of Mrs. Mitchell. There 
is not a word of evidence which would support a finding 
that the life estate in the contract was to terminate on the 
death of Mrs. Mitchell and not on the death of both Mrs. 
Mitchell and appellant. 
It is a general rule of law that manual tradition of a 
deed is not enough, but that the transfer of possession must 
be with the intent of presently passing title, and must not 
be hampered by the reservation of any right of revocation 
or recall. 
This point is annotated in 56 A.L.R. at page 7 46. 
In Weber v Christen, 121 Ill. 91, 11 N.E. 893 and 
Churchill & A. Co. v Ramsey, 48 S.D. 237, 203 N.W. 502 
citing R.C.L. it is said: 
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"When the grantor intends to retain the beneficial title, 
recordation of the deed is not a delivery of it." 
and in 8 R.C.L.-Deeds, at Sec. 52 the law is stated as fol-
lows: 
"The rule cannot be extended (referring to legal effect 
of delivery) so as to make a mere handing to the grantee 
a delivery, where the circumstances show no delivery 
is intended, as where the deed is placed in the hands 
of a grantee with the understanding that it shall be re-
turned to the grantor if he should call for it, but if he 
should not, it is to be placed of record on his death, 
the delivery in such case being incomplete." 
at Sec. 53 it is said: 
"While the rule that the grantor must part with all 
dominion and control over his deed does not mean that 
he must put it out of his physical power to procure re-
possession of it, nevertheless, if the deed remains with-
in the grantors control and liable to be recalled, there 
is, according to almost unanimous authority, no deliv-
ery, notwithstanding that he has parted with its im-
mediate possession. He must retain no right to reclaim 
or recall it." (Italic added) 
The above law is applicable to the instant case because 
it is admitted not only by word but by act in appellant and 
his wife receiving all payments on the contract during the 
lifetime of Mrs. Mitchell. 
Respondents would have the deeds in this case perform 
the functions of a will which cannot be. 
Point 3. 
THE DEEDS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO BE RE-
CORDED AND DO NOT ACT TO CONVEY TITLE TO 
THE REAL PROPERTY. 
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Section 78-2-1 UCA 1943 provides- Acknowledgement: 
"Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate 
is conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged 
or proved and certified in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided. 
78-2-5 PARTY MUST BE KNOWN OR IDENTIFIED. 
"No acknowledgment of any conveyance whereby any 
real estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be 
taken unless the person offering to make such ac-
knowledgment shall be personally known to the offi-
cer taking the same to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to such conveyance as a party thereto, or 
shall be proved to be such by the oath or affirmation of 
a credible witness personally known to the officer 
taking the acknowledgment." 
78-2-2 WHO AUTHORIZED TO TAKE ACKNOWL-
EDGMENTS. 
"The proof or acknowledgment of every conveyance 
whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be affected 
shall be taken by some one of the following officers: 
( 1 ) If acknowledged or proved within this state, by a 
judge or clerk of a court having a seal, or a notary 
public, county clerk or county recorder." 
It is admitted that the notary public took the acknowl-
edgment within the state of Utah and that he was not com-
missioned as a notary public in the state of Utah at the time 
he attached his jurat. 
Section 78-3-1 UCA 1943 provides for the recording 
of documents signed and certified by the officer taking 
the same as provided in this title. In a footnote to this sec-
tion we are referred to the code of Iowa having comparable 
provisions wherein it is said that instruments affecting real 
estate are not deemed lawfully recorded unless previously 
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acknowledged or proved in manner provided by statute. 
Witness Hart, the notary, admitted he did not receive 
the acknowledgment of the deeds by appellants wife until 
several months after the deeds were executed. Nevertheless 
Mr. Hart took the acknowledgment and handed the deeds to 
respondent Merlin Palmer. 
We have direct conflict in the testimony of Mr. Hart 
the notary and that of Merlin Palmer in that Mr. Hart testi-
fied to the fact that he neither read or explained the deeds 
to appellant at the time appellant signed the documents. Mr. 
Merlin Palmer testified to the fact that he did both and 
further that Mr. Hart explained the effect of and meaning 
of a life estate to appellant. Appellant denied that the docu-
ment had been read or explained to him in any way by any-
one. No explanation is made as to the reason for taking the 
appellant before J\!Ir. Hart when it was recognized that he 
was not commissioned as a notary in the state of Utah, if 
appellant was in fact taken before him. 
No consideration having passed from the grantees to 
appellant it was incumbent on respondents to prove that a 
gift was intended, this is particularly true when it is con-
tended that title passed with the handing of the deed by Mr. 
Hart the notary to respondent Merlin Palmer. In the case of 
Szekeres v Reed, (Cal. 3/7 j 50) 215 P2nd 522, it is said: 
"In absence of consideration, grantee must show that 
gift was made with a full knowledge of all facts and 
with a complete understanding of effect of transfer." 
The evidence clearly shows lack of understanding and 
intent on the part of either grantor to part with the title to 
the properties. Intent is indispensable to a legal delivery 
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as was held in the Szekeres case. Both deeds were placed 
under control of appellant in the joint deposit box after 
execution thereof. The grantors intended to sell the Wilm-
ington Avenue property after the deeds were executed and 
employed Mr. Osmond, witness for plaintiff, to show them 
income property, it being their intention as stated to Mr. 
Osmond to convert the Wilmington Avenue property into 
income in order that Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell might have some 
certain income for their old age. 
Not only must there be a showing of intent to convey 
but it must he shown that the intent is to presently pass title 
even though the right to possession and enjoyment may not 
accure until some future time. 
Szekeres vs Reed, supra. 
9 Cal.Jur. p. 153. 
Appellant by the conveyance of his property, gave 
away the sole means of his support. 
There was not inducement shown for the execution 
of the deeds, it is not reasonable to suppose that any reason-
able man would give away his sole means of support as is 
stated in the Szekeres case supra in the following language: 
"There is no doubt, of course, that the deed was handed 
to appellant in attorney Wright's office by Oswald, 
hut the very question at issue is the intent with which 
that manual delivery was made. The trial court had 
the right to consider the fact in 1923, when Oswald, 
without limitation, is supposed to have divested him-
self of the title to the ranch, he was 49 years of age, 
not in ill health, and solely dependent upon the ranch 
for his support. It is not reasonable to suppose that 
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any reasonable man, under such circumstances, would 
give away his sole means of support." 
It is elementary that one retaining a life estate in prop-
erty must maintain the same including the payment of taxes. 
By the act of conveying the Garfield Avenue property which 
was sold under contract and which was contributing to ap-
pellant the sum of $60 a month, appellant gave up his only 
means of support and the only means whereby he could 
pay taxes on the Wilmington Avenue property. 
Point 4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE 
QUESTION OF INTENT AND DELIVERY OF THE 
DEEDS. 
The allegations of appellant's complaint support his 
prayer for relief by which appellant prays among other 
things that the deeds and each of them be declared null 
and void and of no force or effect, and that it be decreed 
that defendants or either of them have no right, title, claim 
or interest in any property described. 
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CONCLUSION 
There being no evidence in the case on which the court 
could find that appellant intended to dispose of his property 
by deed during his lifetime and the court not having found 
that the deeds were intended to take effect upon respondents 
taking control thereof, the judgment of the District Court 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN 
of BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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